EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN AND GLOBAL LEVEL
EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN css
1. INTRODUCTION :
2. CAUSES OF EXTREMISM IN PAKISTAN
this mantra often listen in the media , pakistan is the hub , epicenter of terrorism , extremism and militancy ,after all , extremism and terrorism is different but interdependent . there is no contradiction in the view point that international , regional and proxy wars , all play the due role in creating panic and miseries for these title . let stared from ww2 , us , britain and russia after surrendering germany , japan were odd against in natural resources (oil ,gas ) and capturing trade routes.
different political dimension during that time are as followed.1) ussr (united state of socialist republic) had military might , largest resources of oil , along with significant influenced in central asia ( azerbhijan , tajikistan , uzbekistan , kazakistan , turkmanistan , )2) british empire was collapsing due to internal revolts and change in power paradigm
3) america was emerging as the super power with industrialization and military superiority.in nutshell , the world was bipolar , the whole community was divided between capitalism and communism . the former has free liberal economic policies . privatization , guarantee complete freedom in human rights , while latter symbolized state authoritarian , state owned enterprises and individual freedom was under supervision of state . another important political paradigm shift was the acceptance of creditability of capitalism in europe , while communism was limiting toward central , far asia ,
global trade route the world 70 % trading was and is taking place through seaports . the gwadar port , port qasim and karachi port connect asia with central asia , state of malacca connects far east with the europe , in short , ussr and us were approaching towards to put influence in global sea trade route .
ussr empire extensionalismin 1970 ussr was crossing amu river to capture afghanistan , russia ahs supported dawood khan and helped him in ousted zahir shah presidency .one more interesting factor was the geographic environment in russia , peculiar country was surrounded with frozen water and trade was not possible in winter.baltic sea was frozen with ships in stand still position.so , russia extended her accessed to gwadar or hot water .
american intention after successful adopting new economic order in britain and europe , her policy transferred towards counter communism ,american's think tanks , economist and leaders understood communist was the biggest threat .
the whole era from 1960 to 1985 is popular remembered as cold war time , culmination of this period took place with disintegration of ussr (united social socialist ) in 1988 , former ussr withdrew its troops under geneva accord and world pressure in 1988.
bred of terrorism.
(As of 25 December 2013)
Year
|
Number of
Attacks |
Casualties
| |||
Militants
|
Civilians
|
Unknown
|
Total
| ||
2004
|
1
|
3
|
2
|
2
|
7
|
2005
|
3
|
5
|
6
|
4
|
15
|
2006
|
2
|
1
|
93
|
0
|
94
|
2007
|
4
|
51
|
0
|
12
|
63
|
2008
|
36
|
223
|
28
|
47
|
298
|
2009
|
54
|
387
|
70
|
92
|
549
|
2010
|
122
|
788
|
16
|
45
|
849
|
2011
|
73
|
420
|
62
|
35
|
517
|
2012
|
48
|
268
|
5
|
33
|
306
|
2013
|
26
|
145
|
4
|
4
|
153
|
Total
|
369
|
2,291
|
286
|
274
|
2,851
|
“I would like to openly say that this (operation) is against all hues and colors, and it is without any discrimination, whether it is Haqqani network or TTP or anything,” he said.
Year
|
Number of Articles (n=231)
|
Percentage
|
1999
|
01
|
0.63291
|
2000
|
05
|
3.16455
|
2001
|
36
|
22.78481
|
2002
|
42
|
26.58228
|
2003
|
24
|
15.18987
|
2004
|
16
|
10.12658
|
2005
|
27
|
17.08861
|
2006
|
23
|
14.55696
|
2007
|
31
|
19.62025
|
2008
|
20
|
12.65823
|
2009
|
06
|
3.79746
|
Year
|
Number of Word “Madrassa(s)”
|
Percentage
|
1999
|
00
|
0
|
2000
|
06
|
3.797468
|
2001
|
21
|
13.29114
|
2002
|
73
|
46.20253
|
2003
|
27
|
17.08861
|
2004
|
36
|
22.78481
|
2005
|
28
|
17.72152
|
2006
|
17
|
10.75949
|
2007
|
48
|
30.37975
|
2008
|
19
|
12.02532
|
2009
|
03
|
1.898734
|
TOTAL
|
278
|
Year
|
Number of Phrase “Religious School(s)”
|
Percentage
|
1999
|
2
|
1.265823
|
2000
|
5
|
3.164557
|
2001
|
41
|
25.94937
|
2002
|
45
|
28.48101
|
2003
|
15
|
9.493671
|
2004
|
11
|
6.962025
|
2005
|
23
|
14.55696
|
2006
|
15
|
9.493671
|
2007
|
26
|
16.4557
|
2008
|
13
|
8.227848
|
2009
|
2
|
1.265823
|
TOTAL
|
198
|
Year
|
Number of word “extremism”
|
Percentage
%
|
1999
|
0
|
0
|
2000
|
2
|
1.73913
|
2001
|
0
|
0
|
2002
|
22
|
19.13043
|
2003
|
5
|
4.347826
|
2004
|
6
|
5.217391
|
2005
|
11
|
9.565217
|
2006
|
12
|
10.43478
|
2007
|
19
|
16.52174
|
2008
|
3
|
2.608696
|
2009
|
0
|
0
|
TOTAL
|
80
|
Year
|
Number of word “violence”
|
Percentage
|
1999
|
0
|
0
|
2000
|
1
|
0.869565
|
2001
|
11
|
9.565217
|
2002
|
7
|
6.086957
|
2003
|
8
|
6.956522
|
2004
|
23
|
20.00000
|
2005
|
14
|
12.17391
|
2006
|
16
|
13.91304
|
2007
|
21
|
18.26087
|
2008
|
8
|
6.956522
|
2009
|
6
|
5.217391
|
TOTAL
|
115
|
Year
|
Number of Negative Sentences
|
Number of Positive Sentences
|
Number of Neutral Sentences
|
1999
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
2000
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2001
|
15
|
1
|
0
|
2002
|
34
|
12
|
0
|
2003
|
20
|
2
|
0
|
2004
|
13
|
4
|
0
|
2005
|
14
|
7
|
0
|
2006
|
7
|
2
|
0
|
2007
|
23
|
3
|
1
|
2008
|
14
|
2
|
1
|
2009
|
5
|
1
|
1
|
TOTAL
|
148
|
34
|
3
|
Pakistani military troop levels
| ||
Service
| ||
550,000
|
500,000
| |
22,000
|
5,000
| |
45,000
|
8,000
| |
420,000
|
0
| |
0
| ||
3. INTERNATIONAL CAUSESE
(A) SOVIET UNION INVASION IN AFGHANISTAN:
invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 by troops from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union intervened in support of the Afghan communist government in its conflict with anticommunist Muslim guerrillas during the Afghan War (1978–92) and remained in Afghanistan until mid-February 1989.
In April 1978 Afghanistan’s centrist government, headed by Pres. Mohammad Daud Khan, was overthrown by left-wing military officers led by Nur Mohammad Taraki. Power was thereafter shared by two Marxist-Leninist political groups, the People’s (Khalq) Party and the Banner (Parcham) Party—which had earlier emerged from a single organization, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan—and had reunited in an uneasy coalition shortly before the coup. The new government, which had little popular support, forged close ties with the Soviet Union, launched ruthless purges of all domestic opposition, and began extensive land and social reforms that were bitterly resented by the devoutly Muslim and largely anticommunist population. Insurgencies arose against the government among both tribal and urban groups, and all of these—known collectively as themujahideen (Arabic mujāhidūn, “those who engage in jihad”)—were Islamic in orientation.
These uprisings, along with internal fighting and coups within the government between the People’s and Banner factions, prompted the Soviets to invade the country on the night of Dec. 24, 1979, sending in some 30,000 troops and toppling the short-lived presidency of People’s leader Hafizullah Amin. The aim of the Soviet operation was to prop up their new but faltering client state, now headed by Banner leader Babrak Karmal, but Karmal was unable to attain significant popular support. Backed by the United States, the mujahideen rebellion grew, spreading to all parts of the country. The Soviets initially left the suppression of the rebellion to the Afghan army, but the latter was beset by mass desertions and remained largely ineffective throughout the war.
The Afghan War quickly settled down into a stalemate, with more than 100,000 Soviet troops controlling the cities, larger towns, and major garrisons and the mujahideen moving with relative freedom throughout the countryside. Soviet troops tried to crush the insurgency by various tactics, but the guerrillas generally eluded their attacks. The Soviets then attempted to eliminate the mujahideen’s civilian support by bombing and depopulating the rural areas. These tactics sparked a massive flight from the countryside; by 1982 some 2.8 million Afghans had sought asylum in Pakistan, and another 1.5 million had fled to Iran. The mujahideen were eventually able to neutralize Soviet air power through the use of shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles supplied by the Soviet Union’s Cold Waradversary, the United States.
The mujahideen were fragmented politically into a handful of independent groups, and their military efforts remained uncoordinated throughout the war. The quality of their arms and combat organization gradually improved, however, owing to experience and to the large quantity of arms and other war matériel shipped to the rebels, via Pakistan, by the United States and other countries and by sympathetic Muslims from throughout the world. In addition, an indeterminate number of Muslim volunteers—popularly termed “Afghan-Arabs,” regardless of their ethnicity—traveled from all parts of the world to join the opposition.
The war in Afghanistan became a quagmire for what by the late 1980s was a disintegrating Soviet Union. (The Soviets suffered some 15,000 dead and many more injured.) Despite having failed to implement a sympathetic regime in Afghanistan, in 1988 the Soviet Union signed an accord with the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and agreed to withdraw its troops. The Soviet withdrawal was completed on Feb. 15, 1989, and Afghanistan returned to nonaligned status.
(B) 9/11 and Pakistan’s war on terror
9/11 & Pakistan
The end of the post 9/11 decade is bringing forth mixed reactions from around the world. Analysts are grappling with the historic impact and future implications of the 9/11 attacks. It is commonly held that these attacks and their resulting policies have resulted in the establishment of a New World Order. However it can also be said that certain other events occuring in the same decade have perhaps had more far-reaching consequences than 9/11.
In this decade we witnessed the worst global economic crisis after the Great Depression. Meanwhile Brazil, Russia, India, and China, aka BRIC, rose to the ranks of the new economic powerhouses of the world. This new shift in the world economy is arguably moresignificant in the establishment of the New World Order than 9/11. Moreover the revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa have set a new track for the political future of the Third World. Whatever these event hold for the rest of the world, for Pakistan, it is 9/11 which ranks highest in terms of impact in the last decade and future implications.
No other state equates with Pakistan in the monumental repercussions of 9/11. Out of a total loss of about 35000 lives, security personnel constitute a staggering 3500, which in itself is more than the total victims of 9/11 as well as 30 percent more than the total number of NATO troops killed in Afghanistan to date.
Economically, direct or indirect losses amount to 67 billion US dollars, a figure far too great for a developing state to afford. Pakistan has lost its sovereignty over a large territory in the North West. Most importantly, by being a harbor for domestic and international terrorists, it has plunged into a chaotic uncertainty where the very survival of the state is in question. As the economically devastated US plans an exit strategy from Afghanistan, there seems no exit from terrorism and state failure in sight for Pakistan.
The heart of the matter lies in the simple question, ‘Is the War on Terror our War?’ Religious parties and a significant section of the public declare it America’s war and argue for complete withdrawal of Pakistan from the ‘War on Terror’. Usually those associated with the corridors of power, along with some from the educated class, approve of the war as the better circumstantial option because Pakistan is too weak to take the US head on. The third category belongs to some politicians, liberal intelligentsia and political activists who not only own it as Pakistan’s war but consider it mandatory for Pakistan’s survival and prosperity. Building a consensus on the ‘War on Terror’ should be the highest national priority, which can afford no more delay.
Though the expression ‘War on Terror’ was coined by the Bush administration, Pakistan’s engagement with terrorism and its destined confrontation has been in the pipeline for decades. Even after Zia ul Haq’s notorious regime, Pakistan was in the international limelight in the 90s for arming, training and supporting terrorist activities in Afghanistan, Kashmir, India, Bosnia, and the Middle East. There has always been a domestic political resistance as well as international pressure against such policies.
In fact, the struggle against terrorism existed in Pakistan even before 9/11 and will remain so after America’s exit from Afghanistan. 9/11 did what the assassination of Franz Ferdinand of Austria did for World War One. That assassination ignited the highly inflammable fuel of long established imperialistic rivalries. Similarly in Pakistan, treacherous tracks were being ploughed for at least two decades, eventually leading to Pakistan becoming a harbinger of international terrorism and its sanctuaries. For better or worse, 9/11 essentially brought us to the crossroads where the state had make a choice between supporting or abandoning militancy.
Ideological support for terrorism is a different subject. Those who oppose Pakistan’s fight against terror for other reasons usually point out American aid and pressure coupled with unconstitutionality of Pervez Musharraf; this policy being the continuity of his regime. The question to be asked is who decided to opt for using militancy as a proxy to acheive state objectives, starting from the Zia regime? What is the constitutionality of the policy of pursuing strategic depth and preserving militants as strategic assets? The answers are too apparent to be mentioned. Consistently blaming others for the burns of our ideological contradictions and strategic shortsightedness has brought us damaging international alienation.
Today, the world is speaking of moving on from the post 9/11 situation but we in Pakistan don’t seem ready for this. The end of militancy in Pakistan is not only requisite for American troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan but also pivotal for Pakistan’s bright future. Religious militancy has almost become a civilizational problem for us. The situation is ripe, as until now, the ever needed international consensus against militancy always seemed missing. Our commitment should mean nothing short of a national policy against all militants, disregarding the delusions of ‘strategic assets’ or ‘depth’. If not reason, the sheer urgency of the situation and the enormous losses we have suffered in the past decade should guide our thinking. Time is running out to act decisively against terrorism. Failing to do so could lead to more 9/11′s, more wars, and immeasurable civilian strife for decades to come.
(C)
Drone strikes by US
Since 2004, the United States government has attacked hundreds of targets in Northwest Pakistan using unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency's Special Activities Division.[21] Most of these attacks are on targets in theFederally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border in Northwest Pakistan.
These strikes began during the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, and have increased substantially under his successor Barack Obama.[22] Some in the media have referred to the attacks as a "drone war".[23][24] Initially the U.S. government had officially denied the extent of its policy; in May 2013 it acknowledged for the first time that four U.S. citizens had been killed in the strikes.[25] Surveys have shown that the strikes are deeply unpopular in Pakistan, where they have contributed to a negative perception of the United States.[26]
There is a debate regarding the number of civilian and militant casualties. An estimated 286 to 890 civilians have been killed, including 168 to 197 children.[19][20] Amnesty International found that a number of victims were unarmed and that some strikes could amount to war crimes.[27]
Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, has repeatedly demanded an end to the strikes, stating: "The use of drones is not only a continual violation of our territorial integrity but also detrimental to our resolve and efforts at eliminating terrorism from our country".[28]The Peshawar High Court has ruled that the attacks are illegal, inhumane, violate the UN charter on human rights and constitute a war crime.[29] The Obama administrationdisagrees, contending that the attacks do not violate international law and that the method of attack is precise and effective
Pakistan's government publicly condemns these attacks.[31] However, it also allegedly allowed the drones to operate from Shamsi Airfield in Pakistan until 21 April 2011.[32] According to secret diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks, Pakistan's Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani not only tacitly agreed to the drone flights, but in 2008 requested that Americans increase them.[33] However, Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik said, "drone missiles cause collateral damage. A few militants are killed, but the majority of victims are innocent citizens."[34] The strikes are often linked to anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and the growing questionability of the scope and extent of CIA activities in Pakistan.
Reports of the number of militant versus civilian casualties differ.[35] In general, the CIA and other American agencies have claimed a high rate of militant killings, relying in part on a disputed estimation method that "counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants ... unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent".[36] For instance, the CIA has claimed that strikes conducted between May 2010 and August 2011 killed over 600 militants without any civilian fatalities, a claim that many have disputed.[35] The New America Foundation has estimated that 80 percent of those killed in the attacks were militants.[37] On the other hand, several experts have stated that in reality, far fewer militants and many more civilians have been killed. In a 2009 opinion article, Daniel L. Byman of the Brookings Institution wrote that drone strikes may have killed "10 or so civilians" for every militant that they killed.[38] The Pakistani military has stated that most of those killed were Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants.[39] The Bureau of Investigative Journalism found that 391 to 780 civilians were killed out of a total of 1,658 to 2,597, including 160 children. The Bureau also claimed that since Obama took office at least 50 civilians were killed in follow-up strikes when they had gone to help victims and more than 20 civilians have also been attacked in strikes on funerals and mourners, a practice condemned by legal experts.[40][41][42]
Barbara Elias-Sanborn has also claimed that, "as much of the literature on drones suggests, such killings usually harden militants' determination to fight, stalling any potential negotiations and settlement."[43] However, analysis by the RAND Corporation suggests that "drone strikes are associated with decreases in both the frequency and the lethality of militant attacks overall and in IED and suicide attacks specifically."[44]
A motive that the 2010 Times Square car bomber Faisal Shahzad stated was the repeated CIA drone attacks in Pakistan, his native country.[45]
Drone strikes were halted in November 2011 after NATO forces killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in the Salala incident.[46] Shamsi Airfield was evacuated of Americans and taken over by the Pakistanis December 2011.[47] The incident prompted an approximately two-month stop to the drone strikes, which resumed on 10 January 2012.
In March 2013, Ben Emmerson, the United Nations Special Rapporteur led a U.N. team that looked into civilian casualties from the U.S. drone attacks, and stated that the attacks are a violation of the sovereignty of Pakistan. Emmerson said government officials from the country clearly stated Pakistan does not agree to the drone attacks, which is contradicted by U.S. officials.[48] In October 2013, Amnesty Internationalbrought out a detailed study of the impact of drone strikes that strongly condemned the strikes. The report stated that the number of arbitrary civilian deaths, the tactics used (such as follow-up attacks targeting individuals helping the wounded) and the violation of Pakistani sovereignty meant that some of the strikes could be considered war crimes.[49]
In May 2014, the targeted killing program was described as "basically over," with no attack having occurred since December 2013. The lull in attacks coincided with a new Obama Administration policy requiring a "near certainty" that civilians would not be harmed, a reduced US military and CIA presence in Afghanistan, a reduced al-Qaida presence in Pakistan, and an increased military role (at the expense of the CIA) in the execution of drone strikes.[50][51]
2) The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates the following cumulative statistics about US drone strikes:[20]
· Total strikes: 381
· Total reported killed: 2,537 - 3,646
· Civilians reported killed: 416 - 951
· Children reported killed: 168 - 200
· Total reported injured: 1,128 - 1,557
It is stated in a Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ) report that of all the drone attack victims since 2004, more than 76% of the dead fall in the legal grey zone, 22% are confirmed civilians (included 5% minors) and only the remaining 1.5% are high-profile targets.[53] A classified Pakistani government report obtained in July 2013 by the BIJ shows details of 75 drone strikes that occurred between 2006-09. According to the 12-page report, in this period alone, 176 of the 746 reported dead were civilians, with a further 200 regarded as probable non-combatants.[54]
U.S. President George W. Bush vastly accelerated the drone strikes during the final year of his presidency.[citation needed] A list of the high-ranking victims of the drones was provided to Pakistan in 2009.[55] Bush's successor, President Obama, broadened attacks to include targets against groups considered to be seeking to destabilize Pakistani civilian government; the attacks of 14 and 16 February 2009 were against training camps run by Baitullah Mehsud.[56] On 25 February 2009 Leon Panetta, the director of the CIA, indicated the strikes will continue.[57]On 4 March 2009 The Washington Times reported that the drones were targeting Baitullah Mehsud.[58] Obama was reported in March 2009 as considering expanding these strikes to include Balochistan.[59]
On 25 March 2010 US State Department legal advisor Harold Koh stated that the drone strikes were legal because of the right to self-defense. According to Koh, the US is involved in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates and therefore may use force consistent with self-defense under international law.[60]
Former CIA officials state that the agency uses a careful screening process in making decisions on which individuals to kill via drone strikes. The process, carried out at the agency's counterterrorist center, involves up to 10 lawyers who write briefs justifying the targeting of specific individuals. According to the former officials, if a brief's argument is weak, the request to target the individual is denied.[61] Since 2008 the CIA has relied less on its list of individuals and increasingly targeted "signatures," or suspect behavior. This change in tactics has resulted in fewer deaths of high-value targets and in more deaths of lower-level fighters, or "mere foot soldiers" as the one senior Pakistani official told the Washington Post.[62] Signature strikes there must be supported by two sources of corroborating intelligence. Sources of intel include information from a communication intercept, a visual of millitant training camps or intel from CIA assets on the ground.[63] "Signature" targeting has been the source of controversy. Drone critics argue that regular citizen behaviors can easily be mistaken for militant signatures.
US officials stated in March 2009 that the Predator strikes had killed nine of al Qaeda's 20 top commanders. The officials added that many top Taliban and al Qaeda leaders, as a result of the strikes, had fled to Quetta or even further to Karachi.[64]
Some US politicians and academics have condemned the drone strikes. US Congressman Dennis Kucinich asserted that the United States was violating international law by carrying out strikes against a country that never attacked the United States.[65] Georgetown Universityprofessor Gary D. Solis asserts that since the drone operators at the CIA are civilians directly engaged in armed conflict, this makes them "unlawful combatants" and possibly subject to prosecution.[61]
US military reports asserted that al Qaeda is being slowly but systematically routed because of these attacks, and that they have served to sow the seeds of uncertainty and discord among their ranks. They also claimed that the drone attacks have addled and confused the Taliban, and have led them to turn against each other.[66] In July 2009 it was reported that (according to US officials) Osama Bin Laden's son Saad bin Laden was believed to have been killed in a drone attack earlier in the year.[67]
During a protest against drone attacks, in an event sponsored by Nevada Desert Experience, Father Louie Vitale, Kathy Kelly, Stephen Kelly, SJ, Eve Tetaz, John Dear, and others were arrested outside Creech Air Force Base on Wednesday 9 April 2009.[68][69]
In May 2009 it was reported that the US was sharing drone intelligence with Pakistan.[70] Leon Panetta reiterated on 19 May 2009 that the US intended to continue the drone attacks.[71]
In December 2009 expansion of the drone attacks was authorized by Barack Obama to parallel the decision to send 30,000 more American troops to Afghanistan.[72] Senior US officials are reportedly pushing for extending the strikes into Quetta in Balochistan against the Quetta Shura.[73] Speaking at a news conference in Islamabad on 7 January 2010 Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman stated the drone attacks were effective and would continue but stated that US would make greater efforts to prevent collateral damage.[74] In an effort to strengthen trust with Pakistan 'US sharing drone surveillance data with Pakistan, says Mike Mullen '[75] US defence budget for 2011 asked for a 75% increase in funds to enhance the drone operations.[76]
Compare Mr. Obama's use of drone strikes with that of his predecessor. During the Bush administration, there was an American drone attack in Pakistan every 43 days; during the first two years of the Obama administration, there was a drone strike there every four days.[77]
The Associated Press (AP) noted that Barack Obama apparently expanded the scope and increased the aggressiveness of the drone campaign against militants in Pakistan after taking office. According to the news agency, the US increased strikes against the Pakistani Taliban, which earned favor from the Pakistani government, resulting in increased cooperation from Pakistani intelligence services. Also, the Obama administration toned down the US government's public rhetoric against Islamic terrorism, garnering better cooperation from other Islamic governments. Furthermore, with the drawdown of the war in Iraq, more drones, support personnel, and intelligence assets became available for the campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since Obama took office, according to the AP, the number of drones operated by the CIA over Afghanistan and Pakistan doubled.[78]
According to some current and former counterterrorism officials, the Obama administration's increase in the use of drone strikes is an unintended consequence of the president's executive orders banning secret CIA detention centers and his attempt to close the Guantanamo Bay prison camp, and capturing prisoners has become a "less viable option".[79] Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia alleged that, "Their policy is to take out high-value targets, versus capturing high-value targets... They are not going to advertise that, but that's what they are doing." Obama's aides argued that it is often impossible to capture targets in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Yemen, and that other targets are in foreign custody thanks to American tips. Obama's counter-terrorism adviser, John O. Brennan, said that, "The purpose of these actions is to mitigate threats to U.S. persons' lives," and continued, "It is the option of last recourse. So the president, and I think all of us here, don't like the fact that people have to die. And so he wants to make sure that we go through a rigorous checklist: The infeasibility of capture, the certainty of the intelligence base, the imminence of the threat, all of these things." In response to the concerns about the number of killings, Jeh C. Johnson stated, "We have to be vigilant to avoid a no-quarter, or take-no-prisoners policy."[80]
A study called 'The Year of the Drone" published in February 2010 by the New America Foundation found that from a total of 114 drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and early 2010, approximately between 834 and 1,216 individuals had been killed. About two thirds of whom were thought to be militants and one third were civilians.[19]
On 28 April 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama appointed General David Petraeus as director of the CIA overseeing the drone attacks. According to Pakistani and American officials this could further inflame relations between the two nations.[81]
According to the Washington Post, as of September 2011, around 30 Predator and Reaper drones were operating under CIA direction in the Afghanistan/Pakistan area of operations. The drones are flown by United States Air Force pilots located at an unnamed base in the United States. US Department of Defense armed drones, which also sometimes take part in strikes on terrorist targets, are flown by US Air Force pilots located at Creech Air Force Base and Holloman Air Force Base. The CIA drones are operated by an office called the Pakistan-Afghanistan Department, which operates under the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC), based at CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia. As of September 2011, the CTC had about 2,000 people on staff.[18][82]
US President Obama affirmed on 30 January 2012 that the US was conducting drone strikes in Pakistan. He stressed that civilian casualties in the strikes were low.[83] In a February 2012 poll of 1,000 US adults, 83% of them (77% of the liberal Democrats) replied they support the drone strikes.[84] The Obama administration offered its first extensive explanation on drone-strike policy in April 2012, concluding that it was "legal, ethical, and wise".[85] The CIA's general counsel, Stephen Preston, in a speech entitled "CIA and the Rule of Law" at Harvard Law School on 10 April 2012, claimed the agency was not bound by the laws of war; in response, Human Rights Watch called for the strike program to be brought under the control of the US military.[86] In May, the US began stepping up drone attacks after talks at the NATO summit in Chicago did not lead to the progress it desired regarding Pakistan's continued closure of its Afghan borders to the alliance's supply convoys.[87]
In 2013, the sustained and growing criticism of his drone policy forced Obama to announce stricter conditions on executing drone strikes abroad, including an unspoken plan to partly shift the program from the CIA to the ostensibly more accountable Pentagon,[88] In anticipation of his speech, Obama instructed Attorney General Eric Holder to divulge that four U.S. citizens had been killed by drones since 2009, and that only one of those men had been intentionally targeted.[89] Following Obama's announcement, the United Nations' drone investigator, British lawyer Ben Emmerson, made clear his expectation of a "significant reduction" in the number of strikes over the 18 months to follow,[90]although the period immediately after Obama's speech was "business as usual".[91] Six months later, the CIA was still carrying out the "vast majority" of drone strikes.[92] However, no attack has occurred since December 2013, and the drone war was described as "basically over" in May 2014.[50]
At Senator Dianne Feinstein's insistence, beginning in early 2010 staffs of the United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have begun reviewing each CIA drone strike. The staff members hold monthly meetings with CIA personnel involved with the drone campaign, review videos of each strike, and attempt to confirm that the strike was executed properly.[93]
One of the leading critics of drones in the US Congress is Senator Rand Paul. In 2013, he performed a thirteen-hour filibuster to try to achieve a public admission from U.S. President Obama that he could not kill an American citizen with a drone on American soil, who was not actively engaged in combat. Attorney General Eric Holder responded soon after, confirming that the president had no authority to use drones for this purpose.
Eric M. Blanchard, assistant professor of Political Science at Columbia University, notes that "the use of drones reflects several on-going historical military developments that, in turn, reflect the culture and values of American society..."[94] In this, he alludes to technological idealism (the pursuit of a "decisive" technology to end war) and the need to seize the moral high ground, by delivering more "humane" approaches to warfare. Military support for the drones remains strong for a host of reasons: expansion of battlespace, extension of an individual soldiers capabilities, and a reduction of American casualties.[95] Support has also been noted across the political spectrum as focus in the Middle East shifted from Stabilization (warfare)|stabilization]] in Afghanistan to antiterrorist strikes aimed at al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.
Blanchard also points to a shift in how gender is viewed in terms of warfare with the advent of technology in place of human soldiers. Fighters often represent an idealized masculinity, portraying strength, bravery, and chivalry, but during the Gulf War of 1990-91 the focus had changed. The computer programmers, missile technologists, high-tech pilots, and other servicemen who were centred around technology were now the focal point of news coverage, removing the warrior-soldier from the conversation.[96]
Feminist IR theory has critiqued the drone program, beginning with the language surrounding "technowar". Akin to the language used to defend potential nuclear warfare during the Cold War, drone attacks involved "smart" weapons launched by "intelligent" computers," a perspective given by the user, not of the victims of drone attacks.[97] Victims do not enter the discourse of technowar, and rather the main discourse hopes to emphasize the lack of any human body in war itself, overlooking those victimized. The victims are thereby dehumanized, while the triumphs of "humanless" warfare are purported. In terms of military service, technowarfare has actually given women more opportunities in the military. By moving away from on-the-ground fighting to fighting with machines, debates about women not being strong enough to serve in ground forces have lost traction.[98] This evolving "riskless" warfare also raises a number of other questions however. As society typically does not allow women to be considered "protectors." As the military becomes more "unmanned" with the continued use of drones, the role of women in the military becomes more unclear. Further, the practice of "riskless warfare" relies upon aerial bombings that some argue primarily punish foreign noncombatants, which includes women and children.[96] As what is considered "battlespace" continues to expand, the frontlines of war increasingly make their way into domestic space. Remote operators are susceptible to the same stresses and psychological problems frontline soldiers are faced with, and (typically female) care-givers on the homefront are left with more burdens, including an increased risk of domestic violence.[99]
For at least some of the initial drone strikes, in 2004 and 2005, the US operated with the approval of Pakistan's ISI. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told The New Yorker in 2014 that he allowed the CIA to fly drones within Pakistan and that in exchange the US supplied helicopters and night-vision equipment to the Pakistanis. Musharraf wanted the drones to operate under Pakistani control, but the US wouldn't allow it.[101]
Pakistan has repeatedly protested these attacks as an infringement of its sovereignty and because civilian deaths have also resulted, including women and children, which has further angered the Pakistani government and people.[85][102][103][104] General David Petraeus was told in November 2008 that these strikes were unhelpful.[105] However on 4 October 2008 The Washington Post reported that there was a secret deal between the US and Pakistan allowing these drone attacks.[106] US SenatorDianne Feinstein said in February 2009: "As I understand it, these are flown out of a Pakistani base."[107] Pakistani foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi denied that this was true.[108]
On 8 September 2008, a spokesman for the Pakistani army condemned Washington's killing of Pakistani civilians and warned of retaliatory action: "Border violations by US-led forces in Afghanistan, which have killed scores of Pakistani civilians, would no longer be tolerated, and we have informed them that we reserve the right to self defense and that we will retaliate if the US continues cross-border attacks."[109]
The drone attacks continue, despite repeated requests made by ex-Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari through different channels.[110][111]Baitullah Mehsud, while claiming responsibility for the 2009 Lahore police academy attacks, stated that it was in retaliation for the drone attacks.[112] According to The Daily Telegraph, Pakistani intelligence has agreed to secretly provide information to the United States on Mehsud's and his militants' whereabouts while publicly the Pakistani government will continue to condemn the attacks.[113]
On 28 April 2009 Pakistan's consul general to the US, Aqil Nadeem, asked the US to hand over control of its drones in Pakistan to his government. Said Nadeem, "Do we want to lose the war on terror or do we want to keep those weapons classified? If the American government insists on our true cooperation, then they should also be helping us in fighting those terrorists."[114] Pakistan President Zardari has also requested that Pakistan be given control over the drones, but this has been rejected by the US who are worried that Pakistanis will leak information about targets to militants.[115] In December 2009 Pakistan's Defence minister Ahmad Mukhtar acknowledged that Americans were using Shamsi Airfield but stated that Pakistan was not satisfied with payments for using the facility.[116]
In December 2010 the CIA's Station Chief in Islamabad operating under the alias Jonathan Banks was hastily pulled from the country.[117][118]Lawsuits filed by families of victims of drone strikes had named Banks as a defendant, he had been receiving death threats, and a Pakistani journalist whose brother and son died in a drone strike called for prosecuting Banks for murder.[119][120]
In March 2011 the General Officer Commanding of 7th division of Pakistani Army, Major General Ghayur Mehmood delivered a briefing "Myths and rumours about US predator strikes" in Miramshah. He said that most of those who were killed by the drone strikes were Al-qaeda and Taliban terrorists. Military's official paper on the attacks till 7 March 2011 said that between 2007 and 2011 about 164 predator strikes had been carried out and over 964 terrorists had been killed. Those killed included 793 locals and 171 foreigners. The foreigners included Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Filipinos and Moroccans.[39]
On 9 December 2011, Pakistan's Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani issued a directive to shoot down US drones. A senior Pakistani military official said, "Any object entering into our air space, including U.S. drones, will be treated as hostile and be shot down."[121]
The daily Indian newspaper The Hindu reported that Pakistan reached a secret agreement with United States to readmit the attacks of guided airplanes on its soil. According to a high western official linked with the negotiations, the pact was signed by ISI chief Lieutenant General Shuja Ahmad Pasha, and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency general David Petraeus during a meeting in Qatar January 2012. According to The Hindu, Lieutenant General Pasha also agreed to enlarge the CIA presence in Shahbaz air base, near the city of Abbottabad, where Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was killed in May 2011.[122]
According to unnamed US government officials, beginning in early 2011 the US would fax notifications to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligenceagency (ISI) detailing the dates and general areas of future drone attack operations. The ISI would send a return fax acknowledging receipt, but not approving the operation. Nevertheless, it appeared that Pakistan would clear the airspace over the area and on the dates designated in the US fax. After the May 2011 raid that killed bin Laden, the ISI ceased acknowledging the US faxes, but Pakistani authorities have appeared to continue clearing the airspace in the areas where US drones are operating. According to an unnamed Pakistani government official, the Pakistan government believes that the US sends the faxes primarily to support legal justification for the drone attacks.[123]
In May 2013, a Pakistani court ruled that CIA drone strikes in Pakistan were illegal. A Peshawar High Court judge said the Pakistani government must end drone strikes, using force if needed.[124] Also at that time, an International Crisis Group report concluded that drone strikes were an "ineffective" way of combating militants in Pakistan.[125] A week later, the Pakistani Taliban withdrew an offer of peace talks after a drone strike killed their deputy leader.[126] The Pakistani Taliban's threat to "teach a lesson" to the US and Pakistan, after the aggressive American rejection of peace talks, resulted in the shooting of 10 foreign mountain climbers,[127] as well as a mis-targeted bomb killing fourteen civilians, including four children, instead of security forces in Peshawar at the end of June 2013.[128] In early June, it was reported that the CIA did not even know who it was killing in some drone strikes.[129] A few days later, the freshly elected Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, called for an end to drone strikes in his country.[130] Not long after, a US strike killed another nine people, an act that prompted Sharif to summon the US chargé d'affaires in protest and to demand, again, an "immediate halt" to the Anglo-American assassination programme.[131] At the beginning of July 2013—as a drone strike killed another 17 people in Waziristan[132][133]—the findings of a Center for Naval Analyses study, based on classified US military documents, were reported: American drones strikes were 10 times more likely to cause innocent casualties than bombs or missiles launched from planes.[134]
In July 2013, it was reported that the US had drastically scaled back drone attacks in order to appease the Pakistani military, which was under growing pressure to move to end American "airspace violations". The CIA was instructed to be more "cautious" and limit the drone strikes to high-value targets, to cut down on so-called signature strikes (attacks that target a group of militants based purely on their behavior). Pakistani military officials had earlier stated that these drone attacks cannot continue at the tempo they are going at, and that civilian casualties in these strikes are spawning more militants.[135]
On 1 November 2013, the US killed Hakimullah Mehsud.[136] The expressions of anger in Pakistan about the continuance of drone strikes peaked again at the end of November as a political party announced publicly the alleged name of the CIA's station chief in Islamabad, and called for them and CIA director John Brennan to be tried for murder.[137]
After a six-month break, June 2014 saw a drone strike kill 13 people; the attack was again condemned by Pakistan as a violation of its sovereignty.[138] A month later, in July 2014, a similar attack which killed six militants was again criticized by the Pakistani government, particularly as it had just launched an offensive against militants in the area where the strike occurred.[139]
The British newspaper The Times stated on 18 February 2009 that the CIA was using Pakistan's Shamsi Airfield, 190 miles (310 km) southwest of Quetta and 30 miles (48 km) from the Afghan border, as its base for drone operations. Safar Khan, a journalist based in the area near Shamsi, told the Times, "We can see the planes flying from the base. The area around the base is a high-security zone and no one is allowed there."[141] [141] Top US officials confirmed to Fox News Channel that Shamsi Airfield had been used by the CIA to launch the drones since 2002.[100]
Messages recovered from Osama bin Laden's home after his death in 2011, including one from then al Qaeda No. 3, Atiyah Abd al-Rahmanreportedly, according to the Agence France-Presse and the Washington Post, expressed frustration with the drone strikes in Pakistan. According to an unnamed U.S. Government official, in his message al-Rahman complained that drone-launched missiles were killing al Qaeda operatives faster than they could be replaced.[142][143][144]
In June and July 2011, law enforcement authorities found messages on al Qaeda-linked websites calling for attacks against executives of drone aircraft manufacturer AeroVironment. Law enforcement believed that the messages were in response to calls for action against Americans by Adam Yahiye Gadahn.[145]
On 3 June 2009, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) delivered a report sharply critical of US tactics. The report asserted that the US government has failed to keep track of civilian casualties of its military operations, including the drone attacks, and to provide means for citizens of affected nations to obtain information about the casualties and any legal inquests regarding them.[146] Any such information held by the U.S. military is allegedly inaccessible to the public due to the high level of secrecy surrounding the drone attacks program.[147]The US representative at UNHRC has argued that the UN investigator for extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions does not have jurisdiction over US military actions,[146] while another US diplomat claimed that the US military is investigating any wrongdoing and doing all it can to furnish information about the deaths.[148]
On 27 October 2009 UNHRC investigator Philip Alston called on the US to demonstrate that it was not randomly killing people in violation of international law through its use of drones on the Afghan border. Alston criticized the US's refusal to respond to date to the UN's concerns. Said Alston, "Otherwise you have the really problematic bottom line, which is that the Central Intelligence Agency is running a program that is killing significant numbers of people and there is absolutely no accountability in terms of the relevant international laws."[149]
On 2 June 2010 Alston's team released a report on its investigation into the drone strikes, criticizing the United States for being "the most prolific user of targeted killings" in the world. Alston, however, acknowledged that the drone attacks may be justified under the right to self-defense. He called on the US to be more open about the program. Alston's report was submitted to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights the following day.[150]
On 7 June 2012, after a four-day visit to Pakistan, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay called for a new investigation into US drone strikes in Pakistan, repeatedly referring to the attacks as "indiscriminate," and said that the attacks constitute human rights violations.[151] In a report issued on 18 June 2012, Christof Heyns, U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, called on the US' Obama administration to justify its use of targeted assassinations rather than attempting to capture al Qaeda or Taliban suspects
4. National causes
A Pakistan’s anti-terrorism campaign and armed forces operation
Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. Raheel Sharif, has categorically stated that the ongoing Zarb-e-Azb operation targets all militants without any discrimination and that it is aimed at defeating the menace of terrorism squarely.
Gen. Sharif was speaking at a reception hosted by Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States Jalil Abbas Jilani in honor of the visiting military delegation, and was attended by senior American officials from the State and Defense departments including U.S. Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan Dan Feldman.
The army chief said the Zarb-e-Azb operation has been launched with great commitment and sincerity after consultations with the political government and backing of the entire nation, which is proud of the army’s achievements in the fight against terror.
Zarb-e-Azb, he said, is not just a military offensive but is a concept to defeat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The anti-terror campaign is not restricted to Waziristan and Khyber tribal areas but covers the whole country, he said.
Gen. Sharif saw close counterterrorism cooperation in the months ahead between Pakistan and Afghanistan under the administration of new President Ashraf Ghani and was confident of progress towards establishing peace and stability in the region.
“The phenomenon of IS will not be allowed in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” the army chief said.
He also expressed satisfaction with his visit to the United States and said he had very good meetings with his counterparts on military-to-military relationship.
In his remarks, Ambassador Jilani referred to Pakistan’s determined fight against terror and improving Pakistan-Afghanistan relations at an important time for the region and said the developments require closer Pakistan-U.S. cooperation.
“On the one hand things are looking up, new challenges are also emerging which require good cooperation between our two countries”.
The ambassador said the defense relations are an important component of the wide-ranging Pakistan-U.S. relationship.
In a brief interaction with the media, US Special Representative Dan Feldman said that the Army Chief had constructive and positive meetings during his visit.
Meanwhile, Pakistani army chief discussed military relations and regional security issues including Afghanistan with U.S. lawmakers belonging to Senate Foreign Relations, Intelligence and Armed Services committees from Pakistan’s perspective.
The Pakistani delegation emphasized the position to have relations with India on the basis of dignity and respect. Pakistan’s ambassador Jalil Abbas Jilani accompanied the delegation to meetings at the Pentagon and the Capitol Hill.
(b)
Role of madrassa’s
The western media has consistently been projecting that there is a link between certain madrassas in Pakistan and jihadi elements which they have declared as terrorists. The American elite press has always been indicting madrassas (religious schools) as the main source of violent Islamic radicalism. This study analyses the opinion page (editorials, op-eds and columns) of the Washington Post published between Sept. 11, 1999 to 30 th April 2009 on the issue of madrassas and Pakistani society. It has analyzed the discourse of the Washington Post leading to certain findings.. The inquiry found that l these writings have used the term madrassa(s) for 278 times. The study has also revealed that the term ‘madrassa' or ‘religious school,' have been associated with the ‘violence' and/or ‘extremism/fundamentalism' verifying the hypotheses that the Washington Post articles expose the madrassas as the genesis of violence and hatred towards the West. The research also found that number of sentences communicating negative connotations about madrassas is greater than the number of positive sentences. These findings correlate hypotheses of the study that the Washington Post articles since 9/11 have portrayed the Pakistani madrassas in derogatory manner and addressed them with severe criticism.
Keywords: Terrorism, Madrassas, Religious Schools, Extremism, Fundamentalism
Introduction
The Pakistani madrassas have been a source of making headlines since 9/11 when the twin towers of the World Trade Center were attacked by terrorists in the United States. The investigations so far proved that none of the 9/11 attackers were Pakistani madrassas students; however, the Western press has been citing these madrassas a source of intolerance, extremism and terrorism in the world.
Statement of problem
Evidences suggest that the Western press has taken a very negative stance against the religious schools commonly found in the Pakistani culture where hundreds and thousands students are registered. This study has made an attempt to address the question that how the Washington Post has portrayed the image of the Pakistani madrassas in its opinion page after the 9/11 event.
Madressa: A definition
The term “Madrassa” has been derived from Arabic language which means a “school.” However, review of the prevailing literature concludes that madrassas are those institutions which impart religious education through their own curriculum instead of one prescribed by the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan” (Andrabi et al., 2006).
American Heritage Dictionary of English language (2005) defines the term madrassa as “A building or group of buildings used for teaching Islamic theology and religious law, typically including a mosque.”
Review Of Literature
Despite the abundance of literature available on the positive and negative roles performed by madrassas in the Pakistani society, not a single study has been conducted to investigate the agenda setting role of western media. A large number of opinion and editorial writings appeared in the western media since 9/11 has framed madrassas as the institutions propagating extremism and intolerance in the Pakistani society. The growth of intolerance and violence in Pakistani society has been linked to the growth of madrassa enrolment. (Riaz, 2005).
A number of authors in the west have associated the Pakistani madrassa with conservatism, extremism and have held them responsible for the militancy in the name of Islam (Haqqani, 2002; Singer, 2001). (). Bluestein (2002) citing Washington Post that the the number of madrassas in Pakistan is increasing day by day and their students enrolment between March 2002 and July 2002 has been boosted from 500000 to 1.5 million.
Keeping in view the influence of madrassas in Pakistani society, the United Nations, Western governments and the United States of America also provided texts books to madrassas to limit their influence and introduce their students with the formal education e.g. Mathematics, English and other modern disciplines in education. (Stephens & Ottaway 2002, cited in ICG 2002: 13).
The ICG (International Crisis Group, 2002) surveyed the Madrassa system in Pakistan and its roots within the Pakistani society. The report cited evidences from the existing literature and the news media, probing the madrassa links with the violence and extremism in Pakistan and relates these connections to Taliban and the Al-qaeda.
McClure's ( 2009) study suggests that there is a link between certain madrasas in Pakistan and Islamic extremism. However, this link has been exaggerated in the Western media in an effort to charge the madrassas as the origin of Islamic fundamentalism. Report of the International Crisis Group (2004) asserts that the state education system in Pakistan has failed and religious madrassas are very instrumental in spreading hate against the West. The report recommends the actions to curb the extremism in the Pakistani society. But the report is based on the information given by the Pakistani and the Western media. Mughees (1996) believes thats the treatment of the U.S. elite press is biased relating Hamas to the Islamic extremism.
Ali and Khalid (2008) investigated the portrayal of 12 Muslim countries by the U.S. magazines during 1991-2001 and found that both the magazines have negatively portrayed these Muslim countries. The research categorizes their articles as negative, positive and neutral for these countries.
Theoretical Framework
According to Fairhurst & Sarr (1996) framing consists of three elements: language, thought and forethought to talk about a concept so as to give it a positive or negative connotation. (Deetz, Tracy & Simpson, 2000). Framing is a term used in media studies , and refers to the social construction of a social phenamenon by news media. It influences the individual's perception of the meanings attributed to words or phrases. The frame through the elements, encourage certain interpretations and discourage others. According to Fiske and Taylor, human beings are by nature “cognitive misers” and think very little. Frames provide people a quick and easy way to process information.
The concept of framing is related to the agenda-setting tradition but expands the research by focusing on the essence of the issues at hand rather than on a particular topic. The basis of framing theory is that the media focuses attention on certain events and then places them within a field of meaning. Framing is an important topic since it can have a big influence and therefore the concept of framing expanded to organizations as well
The media draws the public attention to certain topics. This is the original agenda setting ‘thought'. In news items it occurs more than only bringing up certain topics. The way in which the news is brought, the frame in which the news is presented, is also a choice made by journalists. Thus, a frame refers to the way media and media gatekeepers organize and present the events and issues they cover, and the way audiences interpret what they are provided. Frames are abstract notions that serve to organize or structure social meanings. Frames influence the perception of the audience, this form of agenda-setting not only tells what to think about, but also how to think about it. (net, 2011).
Framing is a quality of communication that leads others to accept one meaning over another.. According to Fairhurst & Sarr (1996) framing consists of three elements: language, thought and forethought. Language helps us to remember information and acts to transform the way in which we view situations. To use language, people must have thought and reflected on their own interpretive frameworks and those of others. Leaders must learn to frame spontaneously in certain circumstances. Being able to do so had to do with having the forethought to predict framing opportunities. In other words, one must plan in order to be spontaneous.
So, the present study investigates the opinion page writings appeared in the Washington Post through framing approach. The existing literature indicates that these Islamic-related terms like madrassas, religious schools were associated with extremism, violence, intolerance, terrorist attacks, suicide bombing and bomb blasting.
Methods
To test the hypotheses developed for this study, the Washington Post articles published during the last 9 years and 7 months since September 1999 until April 2009 have been selected.. Although none of the 9/11 hijackers was from Pakistan, , the U.S. media frequently blamed that they were all trained in Pakistan or Afghanistan and were cultivated by religious madrassas. Since then, the U.S. media have on and off held Pakistani religious madrassas responsible for the prevailing state of violence and extremism in Pakistan and other Muslim countries, for this reason, this specific period has been selected for investigation of the hypotheses.
Keeping in mind the nature of the topic, the content analysis research method has been employed in order to examine the coverage given tothe Pakistani religious madrassas by the Washington Post. Using the Nexis.com database and the online edition of the Washington Post, all the stories that contain the words, “madrassa(s), or “religious school(s), terrorism and/or extremism, in one story, have been drawn out for analysis. Multiple searches were used to define the keywords in the headline, leading paragraph and body of the story separately limiting the search within the specified time frame. A contextual analysis of the sentences was performed to investigate the positive, negative and neutral meanings of the words and phrases within the articles of the Washington Post.
The Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis in the study is each single sentence of the articles appeared in the Washington Post. The articles of the Washington Post as a whole serve as contextual unit.
Category Construction
Each sentence of a news article was coded as one of three main categories-positive, negative and neutral, keeping in view the likelihood of its cultivation of positive, negative or neutral coverage and/or portrayal of religious madrassas in the Washington Post.
Positive Sentences (Code 1)
Sentences which depict the constructive role of madrassas either by adopting the formal educational curriculum or their liberal behavior were coded as positive, e.g. Pakistan Walks Fine Line In Cooperation With U.S. (Washington Post, September 15, 2001).
Negative sentences (Code 2)
Sentences which portray the madrassas as source of violence, extremism and terrorism were coded as negative sentences, e.g. Pakistan: Still Schooling Extremists (Washington Post, July 17, 2005)
Neutral Sentences (Code 3)
The sentences which don't clearly mention emphasis on either positive or negative aspects of the madrassas were coded as neutral sentence.
Hypotheses
After reviewing relevant literature, the following hypotheses were formulated:
· Negative coverage of the Pakistani madrassas is more than the positive coverage.
· Majority of the opinion writings hold Islam and the madrassas responsible for promoting violence and extremism in the Pakistani society.
· The Washington Post has been used as propaganda tool against Islam, Pakistan and Madrassas and seems supporting the U.S. foreign policy towards war on terror.
· The Washington Post gives only one side view of the Madrassa system in Pakistan and in most of its articles has related it to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. .
Finding-1. A total of 231 relevant articles were published in the Washington Post. These articles contained the words “madrassa(s), religious school(s), extremism, and violence” excessively highlighting the madrassas as the genesis of hatred, violence and extremism. The number of relevant material appeared in the Washington Post opinion page is very high in the years of 2001, 2002 that is 22 and 26 percent respectively. It sharply went down in 2009.
Table 1 : Total number of relevant articles published in the Washington Post year-wise.
Finding-2. The word ‘madrassa' has been mentioned 278 times in these 231 articles appeared in the Washington Post. The use of the word madrassa keeps very high frequency in the years of 2001 and 2002 and very low frequency is observed in 2009.
Table 2 : Number of word “Madrassa(s)” mentioned in the Washington Post articles.
Analytically, after the 9/11 terrorist incidents the Washington Post articles started discussing the ‘madrassas' more vigorously and the use of word ‘madrassa(s)' varies between 0 to 73 times. The years 2002, 2004 and 2007 have been ranked highest in which the use of term ‘madrassa(s) has been highest. These findings support our hypotheses no. 3 that The Washington Post has been used as a propaganda tool to shore up U.S. foreign policy and to put Pakistani Government under pressure to do more to reform madrassas education system. The content analysis finds that the articles focus and emphasize on the induction of mathematics, English and other modern times subjects and stresses to remove certain objectionable (in their opinion) contents from the madrassa curriculum.
Finding-3. The phrase religious school has been used for 198 times and its association was showed with terrorism, intolerance and violence happening across the world.
Table 3 : Number of phrase “Religious School(s)” mentioned in the Washington Post articles.
The findings in the Table 3 above show that the phrase “religious school(s)” has been used in parallel with the term “madrassa” to explain what does it mean in English language so that the readers of other languages can also understand what is meant by “madrassa.” The analyses of these Washington Post articles depicts that where there is the word “madrassa,” it has often been alternatively explained in English language. It would be appropriate to mention this phrase was frequently appeared with term madrassa to make it understand for the non Muslim readers.. The content analysis of these 231 articles maps that these both terms have been mentioned in plural form 10 times and each time in conjunction with each other just for the purpose to explain the term. Finding-4. In 231 articles, the word ‘extremism' has been mentioned for 80 times. It was related to the madrassas and Islamic literature thought in these madrassas.
Table 4 : The use of word “extremism” mentioned in The Washington Post articles.
Finding-5. The word ‘violence' has been used for 15 times associated it with madras (s) blaming them as the source of violence, extremism and terrorism.
Table 5 : The use of word “violence” mentioned in The Washington Post articles.
Shift it to the conclusion. These findings again support the hypotheses no. 2 of this study.
Finding-6. A total of 148 sentences appeared in the 231 articles that framed the term madrasas as negative and associated it with extremism and violence. On the hand only 34 sentences were appeared in these articles that framed this as positive and framed these madrasas as welfare institutions that educate and feed the poor.
Table 6 : Overall coverage of madrassa issue in The Washington Post articles.
In these Washington Post articles the madrassas have been declared genesis of ‘violence or extremism” in Pakistan and have been projected in derogatory manner. These 231 articles have labeled madrassas with unbalanced criticism with blend of biasness and prejudice with madrassas and have been declared the jihadi training camps, source of hatred against the west, violence and extremism in Pakistani society. The study finds 148 negative sentences against madrassas, Muslims and the Islam. While there have been 34 sentences with quoted remarks from different sources that cite these madrassas and their educational system as the welfare institutions for the poor who cannot teach and feed their children due to bad economy and the prevailing state of unemployment. For the reason those poor send their children to these Islamic madrassas. The findings prove the hypotheses no. 1 that the Washington Post articles since 9/11 have portrayed the Pakistani madrassas in derogatory manner and have exposed them with harsh criticism. The ratio of criticism is much higher as compared to their positive image
(c)
Political battle
Tony Blair will say: 'The threat of radical Islam … is destabilising communities and even nations.' Photograph: Matt Rourke/AP
Tony Blair will warn the west it needs to take sides in the Middle East and move the battle against Islamist extremism to the top of the political agenda.
In a speech to Bloomberg in London on Wednesday, the former Labour prime minister will say: "The important point for western opinion is that this is a struggle with two sides. So when we look at the Middle East and beyond it to Pakistan or Iran and elsewhere, it isn't just a vast unfathomable mess with no end in sight and no one worthy of our support. It is in fact a struggle in which our own strategic interests are intimately involved; where there are indeed people we should support and who, ironically, are probably in the majority if only that majority were mobilised, organised and helped.
"But what is absolutely necessary is that we first liberate ourselves from our own attitude. We have to take sides. We have to stop treating each country on the basis of whatever seems to make for the easiest life for us at any one time. We have to have an approach to the region that is coherent and sees it as a whole. And above all, we have to commit. We have to engage".
He will accept engagement comes at a cost, admitting there is no commitment that doesn't mean taking a risk.
His aides said the keynote speech was not a call for revolution across the region, but to recognise that the west cannot stand aside from struggles such as the one in Syria.
Blair caused controversy when he sided with the Egyptian military's overthrow of the democratically elected government of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his intervention in Iraq in 2003 has been cited as one reason why the west has refused to intervene more in the three-year Syrian war.
Blair will warn: "The threat of this radical Islam is not abating. It is growing. It is spreading across the world. It is destabilising communities and even nations. It is undermining the possibility of peaceful co-existence in an era of globalisation. And in the face of this threat we seem curiously reluctant to acknowledge it and powerless to counter it effectively".
In a clear reference to Saudi Arabia, he will say: "It is absurd to spend billions of dollars on security arrangements and on defence to protect ourselves against the consequences of an ideology that is being advocated in the formal and informal school systems and in civic institutions of the very countries with whom we have intimate security and defence relationships."
He claims some of these countries want to break out of this ideology, but need the west to make it a core part of the international dialogue in order to force the necessary change within their own societies.
Blair will be unrepentant about his apparent rejection of democracy inEgypt, saying the "Muslim Brotherhood government was not simply a bad government. It was systematically taking over the traditions and institutions of the country."
He will claim the revolt of 30 June 2013 led by the army was "not an ordinary protest. It was the absolutely necessary rescue of a nation. We should support the new government and help."
He will add that this does not mean strong criticism of the death sentence on 500 Egyptians, but does require showing "some sensitivity to the fact that over 400 police officers have suffered violent deaths and several hundred soldiers been killed".
Across the Middle East, he will say, there is one essential struggle between pluralistic societies and open economies, where the attitudes and patterns of globalisation are embraced; and those who want to impose an ideology born out of a belief that there is one proper religionand one proper view of it, and that this view should exclusively determine the nature of society and the political economy.
(d)
Chronic poverty
Professor Alpaslan Özerdem is at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies, Coventry University, U.K. With field research experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, he specializes in the politics of humanitarian interventions, disaster response, security sector reform, reintegration of former combatants, and post-conflict state building. He has also taken an active role in the initiation and management of several advisory and applied research projects for a wide range of national and international organizations. He has published extensively and is coauthor of Disaster Management and Civil Society: Earthquake Relief in Japan, Turkey and India (I. B. Tauris, 2006); author of Post-war Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (I. B. Tauris, 2008); co-editor of Participatory Research Methodologies in Development and Post Disaster/Conflict Reconstruction (Ashgate, 2010); coauthor of Managing Emergencies and Crises (Jones & Bartlett, 2011); and co-editor of Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
Dr. Sukanya Podder is a lecturer in International Development at the Centre for Security Sector Management (CSSM) at Cranfield University, and the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom (Shrivenham). Her research and advisory/consulting work is focused upon issues of postconflict reconstruction, security sector reform, and youth involvement in conflict and peace-building. She has previously worked at the University of York and Coventry University (U.K.). With field research experience in Liberia, Mindanao, Sri Lanka, and India, she specializes in qualitative research methods and participatory action research. She has recently completed a British Academy-funded research on youth participation in civil conflict in Mindanao, the Philippines, and is currently working on her third book, Youth in Conflict and Peacebuilding: Mobilization, Reintegration and Reconciliation with A. Özerdem (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.4.3
Subject Area Keywords
Counterterrorism, Ideology, Islamic culture and politics, Nonstate actors, Radicalization, Religious violence, Social movements, Terrorism / counterterrorism, Violent extremism
Abstract
In the complex of motivating variables that define the push and pull factors behind recruitment and participation in civil conflict, "radicalization"—or "violent extremism"—is not conceived as a very strong motive, as is the case with studies on terrorism. As part of disarming youth combatants,the linkages between reintegration outcomes and possible rerecruitment into radical and extremist violence must be better understood to mitigate such risks. In our analysis, the policies guiding reintegration of child soldiers and youth should be better attuned to the relationship between recruitment motivations and reintegration outcomes, and must be approached from a political lens rather than a purely technical one. The risk of radicalization and involvement in violent extremism is ultimately a structural challenge, which needs to address root causes of recruitment rather than trying to find a solution through a band-aid approach of stopgap reintegration assistance.
ILLITERACY
Lack of basic education fuels rise in Taliban and extremism in Pakistan
The last lesson for the children of Gharayband elementary school in Pakistan covered arithmetic and English. Sixty girls sat in a spartan, whitewashed classroom, overlooked by a stern portrait of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of the nation, and recited the eight times table. They moved on to learning the names for parts of the body: nose, eye, lips, head, hand. Afterwards, their teacher left and never returned.
This school in southern Punjab shut down and became an empty, cavernous shell: a 'ghost school' where the teacher's name still appears on the books and she continues to draw an official salary, but without the inconvenience of appearing for work.
At a stroke, 60 girls were deprived of their education, joining countless others across Pakistan with little chance of ever going to school. That was six years ago. Today an old blackboard, laced by a cat's cradle of silver cobwebs, preserves that last lesson inside a silent classroom.
Whatever desks or benches may once have been here were carried off long ago; Jinnah's portrait lies on a filthy floor strewn with litter. 'The teacher left when she was married,' says a woman from Gharayband village, a cluster of homes made from sun-baked mud. 'Nothing has happened here since she went away.'
There are thousands of 'ghost schools' across Pakistan, one symbol of the calamitous state of the country's public education system. In a nation of 170 million people – almost half of whom are under the age of 18 – only 50 per cent of girls and 60 per cent of boys go to primary school, despite the absence of any fees for public education. When it comes to secondary schools, the attendance rate plummets to 23 per cent for boys and 18 per cent for girls.
Even by the standards of the world's poorest countries, these are pitiful figures. Zimbabwe has suffered 29 years of Robert Mugabe's rule, but 90 per cent of the country's children still make it to primary school and almost half go on to secondary education.
As for Pakistan's neighbours: in India more than 80 per cent of children go to primary school and 60 per cent to secondary school; Sri Lanka, after years of conflict, achieves close to 100 per cent and 90 per cent respectively.
Even Afghanistan, ruined by decades of war, does better than Pakistan in one vital respect: it gives primary schooling to a higher proportion of boys – 66 per cent – than its far more developed neighbour.
What are the consequences of Pakistan's singular failure to educate its people? About half of all the nation's adult men and two-thirds of women are illiterate, even though the authorities have set a notably low bar for judging literacy: the ability to sign one's own name. In a country that deploys nuclear weapons, most adults cannot even manage this elementary task.
This is a failure almost without parallel. One desperately poor nation after another has achieved better literacy rates than Pakistan: two thirds of Indian adults can read and write; in Congo, Africa's most troubled and war-ravaged country, 67 per cent of adults are literate.
People who cannot read or write are easier to control – and this provides part of the explanation for the absence of a viable state education system. Yet the illiterate are also more vulnerable to the beguiling simplicities of Islamic radicalism. If Pakistan has become the epicentre of global extremism, the fact that basic education is not on offer to tens of millions is a big part of the reason why.
Today the Taliban have burst out of their stronghold along the north-west frontier and penetrated much of the rest of Pakistan. Punjab, the most populous and developed province, is home to much of the military and political elite. Yet the Taliban have now made it the epicentre of their terror campaign, conducting a series of strikes in Punjab's main cities.
In the last month alone, gunmen and suicide bombers have raided the army's headquarters in Rawalpindi and police training centres in Lahore, the provincial capital, killing at least 40 people in five separate incidents.
The area around Gharayband in southern Punjab was once virtually immune to the Taliban's brand of Sunni zealotry. Its people traditionally observed a moderate strand of Islam, merging orthodox piety with a deeply ingrained belief in local saints and shrines that pre-dates the arrival of the Muslim faith, but the Taliban have now turned this area into a key recruiting ground, and southern Punjab is steadily succumbing to violent extremism.
The Chenab river gives life to a verdant landscape of emerald fields laden with rice, cotton and wheat. To the people who live alongside its waters, one of five great rivers flowing through Punjab, its swirling current brings hope and dread. Every few years the Chenab bursts its banks and inundates many villages.
From one flood to the next, however, people must live with one certainty: their children are very unlikely to go to school. While elsewhere in Pakistan there are schools but no teachers, here there are scarcely any schools.
Along the banks of the Chenab in Muzaffargarh district, the government provides only four for a population of almost 750,000. Officials offer a simple explanation: if we build schools near the river, they could be flooded.
But not everywhere risks being swamped and, in any case, secure defences against the Chenab's waters can be constructed. The reality is that neither the money nor the teachers can be found.
In the village of Jotianwala, life revolves around the eternal cycle of planting and harvesting. Rab Nawaz farms two and a half acres of fertile soil. He owns four water buffaloes and three cows, placing him among the village's more fortunate inhabitants.
A flat-roofed home, built from sun-baked mud and swept perfectly clean, houses three generations of his family: Nawaz, his wife, Amna, their four children, and Nawaz's mother, Bheeran.
None of their births was registered, but Nawaz looks about 40, Amna seems roughly the same age and their youngest daughter, Mervish, is still a baby. Their two older girls, Samina and Rosina, are both teenagers, while their son, Mohammed, is a toddler. Bheeran, the grandmother, looks about 60.
Little has changed, let alone improved, over these generations. Nawaz's mother never went to school, nor did he, and nor did his wife. Today none of their children goes to a government school; two occasionally attend an informal 'community school' in a nearby village, where local people teach some children themselves. But it is tiny, has few books and so cannot provide a real substitute. Consequently, none of Nawaz's children can read or write.
Bheeran has no doubt that life is harder for her son and his children. 'I cannot read anything, not even the holy Koran,' she says. 'I have the holy book in the house, but this is just for blessing, not for reading. Once, I had hoped that my son's life and then my grandchildren's lives would be better than mine. But life is worse for them because there are more people today and the same amount of land. I feel helpless because nothing is within our control.'
When Nawaz was a boy, he did not envy children who went to school. 'My only ambition was to have some animals, some cows and water buffaloes, and that we would take them to our fields,' he says.
But he has higher aspirations for his own children: Nawaz desperately wants them to go to school. 'We want our children to be like you,' he says suddenly. 'You are educated, you are working, you are seeing the world. Our children will live and die here.'
He adds, 'Everyone has a strong desire to see their children educated. But the problem is there is no school here. Where do we send our children?' The nearest government primary school is more than 10 miles away on the far side of the Chenab. Even if they could get a place there, his children could not walk that distance every day – nor find the money to pay a boatman to carry them across the river.
His daughters appear resigned to spending the rest of their lives in the village. When I ask Samina what she wants to do when she grows up, she seems baffled. 'I never think about it,' she says. 'But I want to go to school.' Her sister, Rosina, has thought about life beyond Jotianwala. 'I want to study and then find a job. I want to be a teacher,' she says.
In this village of 47 families, there is only one literate adult – and only one child who occasionally attends the government school. Yassin, who does not know his age but looks about 14, can make the journey because he owns a secondhand bicycle worth about £4. His attendance, though, is erratic at best and impossible when the monsoon rains fall. Why does he go to the trouble at all? 'Because I want to be a teacher,' he answers.
There are villages blessed with both schools and teachers. But those who follow the career that Yassin aspires to often question why they bother. 'We are like the divorced wives of the government,' one teacher tells me. 'We have no rights and no one pays any attention to us.'
Primary school teachers often earn as little as £30 per month – not much above the World Bank's definition of absolute poverty of £20 per month – and they are largely untrained: many did not complete secondary education. They face the overwhelming temptation to give up and lead the relatively easy life of an absentee teacher, collecting their salaries without ever appearing for work, with corrupt officials turning a blind eye in return for a share of the spoils.
Those who are dedicated enough actually to do their jobs endure working conditions that almost defy belief. Many rural schools do not possess lavatories, not even pit latrines.
In the village of Basti Nawab Shah, the government school has no lavatory and no running water, beyond an untreated trickle from an old handpump. There are two classrooms for 180 pupils. The authorities provide textbooks, but children must buy their own pens and exercise books – a burden that many families cannot afford.
Children are not given any food by the school; many come to classes without having eaten at home. Some children are taught in the open air, others are crammed into the crumbling, bare, baking-hot school building.
Asghar Ali Shakar, a 37-year-old teacher, makes ingenious use of the available space by conducting two different lessons in one classroom – at the same time. On his right, four rows of seven-year-olds are perched on wooden benches.
On Shakar's left, there are 25 more boys and girls, all aged about 11. 'There is no other way,' he says. 'I give one class some task to memorise, and then I move on to the other class. Then I swap over.'
The seven-year-olds are learning English by reciting a passage from their textbook. 'Ahmed is a postman, he wears a khaki dress,' they chant. 'He brings letters, cards and money orders.' Meanwhile, on the other side of the classroom, Shakar is leading the 11-year-olds in a handwriting exercise. Tiny hands trace Urdu and English characters on wooden tablets shaped like cheeseboards. Examples of the best handwriting are posted on the wall.
One boy, Abid Sattar, has succeeded in mastering joined-up handwriting in English. His painstakingly drawn passage from a textbook is proudly on show: 'The scene of the crime was a goldfish bowl. Goldfish were kept in the bowl at the time. That was the scene. And was the crime.'
Thin, barefoot and dressed in a grubby blue salwar kameez, Abid tells me, 'I was doing a lot of practice with pencil and paper. Then I moved to using the wooden slate. Then I tried with the big sheet of paper that's on the wall.'
Yet his achievement is not the only one commemorated on the wall. A stone plaque solemnly records that this shell of a school was opened in 1991 by the local member of the National Assembly, Shah Mahmoud Qureshi, who now serves as the foreign minister.
Qureshi's background could scarcely be more different from Abid's. A scion of the Punjabi elite, he went to Aitchison College in Lahore, Pakistan's imitation of Eton, which counts three prime ministers, one president and Imran Khan among its alumni, and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, where he read law.
Abid is uncertain of his age, but looks about 10. What might he achieve if his teacher were not forced to conduct parallel lessons in a single, sweltering classroom? And for the price of the foreign minister's plaque, Abid's school could have built some latrines.
In the morning respite before the midday heat, scores of boys parade in orderly rows. The sun's rays flicker behind the green leaves of mango trees as they stand to attention beneath the flag of Pakistan and sing the national anthem.
Morning assembly at the government elementary school in Sunakhi village seems to offer a rare picture of hope. Their school received a complete overhaul earlier this year when the authorities provided a new building with five clean and functional classrooms, electricity and safe water from a handpump.
Ubaid Ullah, the brisk and efficient headmaster, is proud of his refurbished school. But not everything is quite as good as it looks. The school has sanitation in the form of two lavatories, but these are kept padlocked so that only teachers – and not children – are able to use them. This apparently is common practice in schools lucky enough to have facilities at all.
There are 271 boys on the register, but only 150 have appeared for this assembly. The cotton-picking season has begun and many families need their children to work in the fields, meaning that attendance of about 50 per cent is pretty standard. Wheat is the most commonly grown crop here, and during its harvest in May, school attendance falls still further, often to as low as 20 per cent.
'This is a poor area and the children are needed in the fields,' Ullah says. 'We have been trying to persuade parents to send their children to school. But because of poverty, some people are not interested in education.'
To grasp why Pakistan's state education system has become such a wreck, you need understand only a few figures. This year the central government will spend 66 per cent of its budget on defence and debt servicing, and only 2.5 per cent on education. Throw in the immense burden of corruption and there is precious little money for schools. The central education budget is only £478 million, or about £6 for each school-age child in the country. Defence, by contrast, receives £2.6 billion according to the official figure – and probably more in reality.
Some countries have an army, but in Pakistan the army has a country – or so goes the rueful joke. Thanks to the nation's confrontation with India over Kashmir and the constant turmoil on the Afghan frontier, the army comes first on Pakistan's list of priorities. The debt repayments that consume most of the budget are mainly the legacy of past loans taken out to buy weapons.
Mohammed Aslam Kambo serves as the state secretary for schools in Punjab. Polite and businesslike, he holds court in a spotless, air-conditioned office in Lahore, surrounded by deferential functionaries. He is anxious to deny the existence of any serious problem. 'In Punjab, we don't have ghost schools. I'm sure there's not a single one,' he airily assured me a day before I visited the husk of the school in Gharayband. 'We have a sufficient level of primary schools,' he added. 'It's next to impossible that you will find a population of 100 houses and no state school.'
Those who are passionate about the problem, though, have no doubt about the consequences of this national failure to build a viable education system. If the government does not provide schools, the wealthy few will either emigrate or send their children into private education; the rest will look to madrassas, the Islamic colleges that have sprung up across the country and offer free education from the age of five to 18, mainly for boys though some admit girls. The number of madrassas has climbed exponentially, from a few hundred at independence in 1947 to more than 10,000 today.
'Parents will want to send their kids somewhere and if the madrassa is the only thing that's functioning, then that's where they'll go,' Mohammed Qazilbash, the country director of Save the Children, says.
The Taliban movement was born in Pakistan's madrassas, giving these institutions a reputation as factories for extremism, dedicated to brainwashing their pupils and turning out terrorist recruits.
That image is indelible, but deeply unfair none the less. A minority of madrassas radicalise their students, but most are innocent if austere places where poor children get their only chance of an education.
The danger is not so much that madrassas deliberately brainwash their charges. The key problem is that memorising the Koran is about the only skill they impart. All madrassas have one advantage: they offer free meals to their children and often lodgings, too, while most state schools are incapable of providing their pupils with any food at all.
But the average graduate of a madrassa will not have the ability to hold down a normal job in the formal economy. The religious colleges simply add to the legions of Pakistanis who are unemployable by anyone except the Taliban.
President Asif Ali Zardari's government has officially recognised the problem and promised to treble the total education budget to seven per cent of national income by 2015. Others are also trying hard.
Britain's Department for International Development has made education a key priority and will spend £250 million over the next five years on training teachers and restoring schools. But this money will go through the government, raising questions over whether it will be spent effectively.
Save the Children has been trying to improve state education for years and Qazilbash is incensed by the consequences of its neglect. 'Our economic, social, cultural and political growth is retarded,' he says. 'How can you expect to build a nation when you treat the future of the nation with such disdain, such disinterest
5
Economic impacts
A
The Pakistan military has its roots in the British military, in which, where many Indian Muslims served in the World War II prior to the partition of British India by the British Empire.[13] While the Indian Muslims chose to served in the Pakistani military, the military formations with Muslim majority units moved to Pakistan.[13] General Ayub Khan, HMS Chaudiere and Asghar Khan were few of the high officials who opted for Pakistan.[13]Many of the senior officers who would form the Pakistan Armed Forces had fought with the British forces in World War II, thus providing the newly created country with the professionalism, experience, and leadership it would need to defend itself against India.[14] In a formula arranged by the British, military resources were supposed to have been divided between India and Pakistan with a ratio of 64% going to India and 36% for Pakistan; however, Pakistan initially demanded 50% of the equipment.[15]
Initially, the Pakistani military retained the British military tradition until 1956 when the United Statesdispatched its special military adviser groups to Pakistan, where the American military tradition and thought process general transferred to the Pakistan's military.[16] In March 1956, the Pakistani military order of precedence of three services changed from "Navy-Army-Air Force" to "Army-Navy-Air Force".[17]
Between 1947 to 1971, Pakistan has fought three direct conventional wars against India, with 1971 war witnessing the succession of East-Pakistan as independent Bangladesh.[18] Rising tensions withAfghanistan in the 1960s and indirect war fought against the Soviet Union in the 1970s led to a sharp rise in the development of Pakistan Armed Forces.[19] In 1999, an extended period of intense border skirmishing with India resulted in a redeployment of forces.[20] As of 2014, the military is conducting counterinsurgency operations along the border areas of Afghanistan, while continuing to participate in several United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Over past decades, the armed forces have taken the control of the civilian government in various military coups since 1957 to restore order in the country, citing corruption and gross inefficiency on the part of the civilian leadership. While many Pakistanis have supported these seizures of power,[21] others have claimed that political instability, lawlessness, and corruption are direct consequences of military rule.[22][23][24]
It is estimated that approximately 60–70% of Pakistan's military personnel are deployed along theIndo-Pakistan border.[25] In the aftermath of the United States invasion of Afghanistan, more than 150,000 personnel were shifted towards the Tribal Areas adjacent to Afghanistan.[26] Since 2004, Pakistan's military forces have been engaged in the military efforts against al-Qaedaextremists.
In comparison with multinational and US forces, Pakistan's military has suffered the highest number of casualties in the war, both in confrontations with al-Qaeda and the United States (See: Pakistan-United States skirmishes). After the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the subsequent standoff with India, several combat divisions were redeployed to Eastern and Southern Pakistan.
In addition to its military deployments, the armed forces also assist the government in responding to natural disasters such as the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and the nation-wide floods of 2010.
As of 2010, about 617,000 people[8] were on active duty in the military, with an additional 420,000 in the paramilitary forces[8] and 513,000 people in reserve. It is an all volunteer military, but conscriptioncan be enacted at the request of the President with the approval of the Pakistani parliament.[citation needed] The military is the seventh largest in the world and has a large number of troops deployed around the globe in military assistance and peacekeeping operations.
Pakistan is the only predominantly Muslim country in which women serve as high-ranking officers and in combat jobs.[30]
Members of the Pakistani military hold a rank, either that of officer or enlisted, and can be promoted.
The following table summarizes current Pakistani military troop levels:
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